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.N THE SUPREME COURT 
JF THE STATE OF UTAH 
,y~~STERN CONTRACTING 
COHPORATION (Employer) and 
EMPLOYERS l\lUTU AL LIABIL-
rrY lNSURANCE COMPANY OF 
Wl~CONSIN (Carrier), 
Petitioners, \ 
-vs.-
:NDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and LEO A. DAVIS 
Respondents. 
( 
' 
Case 
No. 9970 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Petitioners, Western Contracting Corporation (em-
ployer) and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Com-
pany of "Tisconsin (carrier), appeal a decision of the re-
~pondent, Industrial Commission of Utah, granting to 
respondent Leo A. Davis (employee) compensation for 
permanent partial disability under the provisions of 
Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
rhe Commission granted compensation for 100 weeks, 
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the period prescribed by the statutory schedule for total 
loss of function of one eye. Petitioners question the 
propriety of that award on the facts of this case. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
After consideration of the facts and the law, the 
respondent, Industrial Commission, awarded the re-
spondent, Leo A. Davis, compensation of 100 weeks for 
total blindness of one eye, in accordance with the statu-
tory schedule in Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioners seek an order of this court declaring that 
the Industrial Commission improperly assessed the disa-
bility under the statute by reason of the fact that said 
Commission assessed the loss of visual function without 
correction by glasses. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As indicated by the petitioners' brief, the facts are 
stipulated. Respondent Leo A. Davis injured his right 
eye in an industrial accident and the eye is essentially 
blind without corrective optical lens. With such lens, 
approximately 50% of the eye's function is restored. 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH STATUTE PROVIDES FOR COM-
PENSATION FOR LOSS OF USE OF AN EYE 
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WITHOUT REGARD rro 'VHETHER OR NOT 
HUCil LOSS CAN BE Al\lELIOR.ATED BY 
TH~~ USE OF EYEGLASSES. 
A. THE STATUTORY SCHEDULE FOR 
AWARDS IN THE UTAH WORKMEN'S 
COllPENSATION ACT ll1UST BE FOL-
LOWED IN ALL CASES WITHOUT RE-
OARD TO ARTIFICIAL APPLIANCES. 
B. WHERE THE STATUTE DOES NOT 
SPECIFICALLY MENTION GLASSES, 
THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY SUP-
PORTS THE COMMISSION'S POSITION 
THAT THEIR EFFECT SHOULD NOT 
BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING 
COMPENSATION. 
C. THE PURPOSE OF THE WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION ACT IS TO PROVIDE 
COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF OR 
DAJ.L1GE TO .A BODY MEMBER AND 
NOT SOLELY TO PROVIDE FOR LOSS 
OF EARNING POWER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH STATUTE PROVIDES FOR COM-
PENSATION FOR LOSS OF USE OF AN EYE 
WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER OR NOT 
SUCH LOSS CAN BE A?\IELIORATED BY 
THE USE OF EYEGLASSES. 
A. THE STATUTORY SCHEDULE FOR 
ATVA.RDS IN THE UTAH WORKMEN'S 
COJ!PENSA.TION ACT MUST BE FOL-
LOlYED IN ALL CASES WITHOUT' RE-
G.A.RD TO ARTIFICIAL APPLIANCES. 
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Almost every state, in its Workmen's Compensation 
Act, provides a statutory schedule which requires com-
pensation for certain periods of time in the case of loss 
of a member of the body and depending upon which mem-
ber is lost. The purpose of such a statutory schedule is 
to make certain that an employee is compensated for loss 
of a body member even though this loss does not affeet 
the employee's earning capacity. The schedules eval-
uate the member lost and generally give the results of 
such evaluation in terms of a specific number of weeks 
during which payments are to be made. In other words, 
since the loss of an arm at the elbow appeared to be 
more significant than the loss of a great toe with the 
metatarsal bone thereof, the Utah State Legislature 
provided that weekly payments should be made for the 
former for 180 weeks and for the latter for only 30 
weeks. S~ction 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. This fixed compensation is then tied into the 
amount the employee was earning before the accident so 
as to not put an unwarranted burden upon any specific 
employer. 
The compensation provided by the statutory schedule 
is automatic. The Industrial Commission of the State of 
Utah (hereinafter called the "Commission") does not 
have authority to wait and see if the injured employee 
gets. an artificial arm to replace the real one. It does 
not inquire as to whether a plain hook or an expensive 
artificial hand which opens and closes is obtained. The 
schedule in the statute says that 180 weeks of payments 
shall be made for an arm lost at the elbow, and this is 
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what iR paid without regard to any appliance which the 
employee may obtain to ameliorate the loss. 
Similarly, in the case of a lost leg, the statute pro-
rides that 180 weeks shall be paid where a leg is lost "at 
or near the hip joint as to preclude the use of an arti-
ficial limb.'' "There ''the stump remains sufficient to per-
mit the use of an artificial limb,'' the statute provides 
for only 150 weeks of payments. It should be noted, 
however, that the Commission is not authorized to wait 
and see if such an artificial limb is in fact obtained, but 
must require only 150 weeks of payments so long as the 
use of such a limb is possible. This is true even though 
such an artificial limb may be so uncomfortable on an 
t.lmployee that he may have to stop wearing it. The 
language about an artificial limb, then, does not say 
that more compensation will be awarded if such a limb 
is not obtained. It simply says that the greater amount 
will be awarded if the use of such a limb is precluded 
by the fact that the severance was so high. The only\ 
p11rpose of the artificial limb language is to show that 
lfhere more of the leg is lost, the employee gets 'more 
com.petJSation. The all'ard is based on. the extent of the 
loss zeifhout consideration of appliances which may 
ameliorate s·uch loss. 
Applying the above reasoning to the eyes, it is 
t)asy to see why awards should be based on loss before 
~lasses are obtained. Again, the award is based on loss 
of the member. Since the Legislature didn't make any 
further breakdowns after loss by enucleation as dis-
tinguished from total blindness of an eye, it is clear 
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that its intent was to award 100 weeks whenever an 
eye was blinded without enucleation. 
The parties to this case have stipulated, and the 
law in virtually all jurisdictions confirms, that an eye 
in the condition of Mr. Davis' eye is "totally blind" 
within the meaning of the statute. (§ 35-1-66.) As in 
the case of the artificial arm or leg, the Commission is 
not authorized to see what can be done with artificial 
appliances to return some of the use of the injured 
eye. There is no basis for the claim that the .use of the 
body member should be evaluated after a helpful ap-
pliance is used in the case of an eye but before use of 
such an appliance in all other cases. The Commission 
must simply base the award on the fact of total 
blindness. 
B. WHERE THE STATUTE DOES NOT 
SPECIFICALLY MENTION GLASSES, 
THE 'fVEIGHT OF AUTHORITY SUP-
PORTS THE COMMISSION'S POSITION 
THAT THEIR EFFECT SHOULD NOT 
BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING 
COMPENSATION. 
Petitioners state that ''the view that visual im-
pairment should be evaluated on a corrective basis is 
the one taken by almost every court which has consid-
ered the problem.'' Petitioners' brief, page 4. Peti-
tioners quote Schneider, The Law of lYorkmen's Com-
pensation, Volume II, Second Edition, and 58 Ameri-
can Juris prudence 785 as supporting this position. 
However, American Jurisprudence has conveniently 
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t•itetl the only two state jurisdictions, New York and 
~I i<·higan, which support its statement, and Schneider·~ 
~tatement was written in 1932, long before the great 
bulk of the states had ruled on the question. 
It is true that a few other states besides New York 
and ~1 ichigan have said that glasses should be used 
when determining loss of eyesight. However, in each 
c.•usc.\ glasses u•cre required by the statute and nothing 
was left to the courts. These states and their statutes 
whieh require the use of glasses are as follows: Con-
necticut- General Statutes of Connecticut, 1958 revis-
ion, Section 31-307; Indiana- Burns Indiana Statutes 
Annotated, § 40-1303; Maine - Revised Statutes of 
Maine, c. 31, § 13; Rhode Island - Public Law, 1954, c. 
:t!!)7, ..:\ rt. II, § 12 (a-d) ; and l\Iassachusetts - Anno-
tated Laws of :Massachusetts, ch. 152, § 36. 
~tates which have statutes similar to the Utah stat-
ute, which do not require that glasses be used, have held, 
almost without exception, that these appliances should not 
be used in determining the loss suffered by the employee. 
Some of these states, with cases so holding, are as fol-
lows: Colorado (Jewell Collieries Corp. v. Kenda, 110 
Colo. 394, 134 P. 2d 206 [1943]); Delaware (Alessa;ndro 
Petrillo Co. v. Jlat·ioni, 3 W. W. Harr. 99, 131 A. 164 
[1926]); Idaho (J/ cDonald Y. State Treasurer, 52 Idaho 
535, 16 P. 2d 988 [1933]) ; Kansas (McC1tllo1tgh v. South-
lt'f:dtT·n Bell Tclephoue Company, 155 Kan. 629, 127 P. 
~d 467 [ 1~)42] ; ~Iinnesota (Licingston v. St. Paul Hy-
draulic Hoist Compauy, 203 ~linn. 62, 279 N.W. 829 
[ Ul~iS]); llissouri ( Graf Y • ... Vat ional 8 eal Products Com-
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pany, 225 :Mo. App. 702, 38 S.W. 2d 518 [1935]; North 
Carolina (Schum v. Catawba Upholstering Company, 214 
N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 [1938]; Oklahoma (Parrott Jl!otor 
Company v. Jolls, 168 Okl. 96, 31 P. 2d 925 [1925]; West 
Virginia (Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeal Boa.rd, 118 W. Va. 565, 191 S.E. 49 [1937]); 
Nebraska ( Otoe Food Products Co. v. Cruickshank, 141 
Neb. 298, 3 N.W. 2d 452 [1942]); and New Jersey (Jo-
hO!Yl!Jtson v. Union Iron Works, 97 N. J. Law 569, 117 A. 
639 [1922]. 
It should be noted that the vast majority of these 
cases which support the Commission's position were de-
cided after 1932, the date in which Schneider's statement 
quoted in petitioners' brief was written. 
Most of the states not covered in the last two para-
graphs have statutes worded similar to the Utah statute 
but have no case law interpreting the same. The states 
given, however, are sufficient to show that the great 
weight of authority is contrary to petitioners' stated 
r position. The two above-mentioned states, the District 
of Columbia, and an occasional federal court in dictum, 
are the only authorities to the contrary. 
The case of Otoe Food Products Co. v. Cruickshank, 
supra, purports to rely on cases going both ways from 
twenty-nine jurisdictions and, although the court's im-
pression of the rule in various jurisdictions is often 
erroneous, the court's ultimate conclusion has a good 
deal of merit. The court stated: 
"In an analysis of Section 48-121 Comp. St. 
1929, we see nothing in the act indicating an inten-
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tion on the part of the legislature that disability 
after <·orrection should be the basis for awarding 
t•ompensation, where there has been an eye injury. 
• • • If the act is faulty, the correction should be 
mnue by the legislature and not by the court.'' 
P. 4:>;J. 
In reaching the conclusion that glasses should not 
be used in determining the extent of injury, the Indiana 
t~ourt in Shaw v. Rosenthal, 112 Ind. App. 468, 42 N.E. 
2d 383 ( 1 !)42), said that while the ''general purpose of\ 
the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act is to compensate for 
t'unetional loss, nevertheless those parts of the act which 
fix a definite amount of compensation for a specific 
injury are arbitrary in nature and are based not on loss 
of earning capacity but on actual physical loss.'' P. 384. 
Th(' rourt ignored a reference to glasses in another sec-
tion of the statute in making its award. 
Petitioners have raised the question of the holding 
in the case of Jloray v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 
404, HID P. 1023 (1921). It is true that the Utah Su-
pr('me Court cited the Michigan and New York view 
stated in r'linc v. Studebaker, 189 Mich. 514, 155 N.W. 
;)19 (1915 ), but this was only for the purpose of sup-
porting the Utah Industrial Commission's award based 
on an injury to eyes and determined without correction 
by ~lass~s. The Commission in .:.lloray, as in the instant 
case, had awarded compensation based on complete 
l()ss of one eye despite the fact that substantial vision 
eould be gained by the use of glasses. The injured 
employee appealed, contending that the award was too 
small. In upholding the Industrial Commission's 
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award, the court cited Cline to show that it would be eas-
ier to find that the award was too large than it was too 
1 small. It should be noted that Cline was one of the I few cases on this point on the books in 1921. Thus, 
II the Moray court had no other available authority and could not yet see how the weight of authorities would ultimately be lined up. Secondly, the Cline position 
was simply stated to show the employee the absurdity 
of his appeal. The actual holding of the Moray case 
upheld the Industrial Commission's award which was 
arrived at without the use of glasses. 
Contrary to the dicta in Moray, the Kansas court 
in McCullough v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 155 
Kan. 629, 127 P. 2d 467 ( 1942) said : 
''The cases bearing upon the question as to 
whether compensation for injury to an eye should 
be computed without or with the aid of corrective 
lens are collected in 99 A.L.R. 1507, and in pre-
vious annotations and in the subsequent decisions. 
Each of these annotations has noted a conflict in 
the authorities, which it is said continues to exist. 
l''rhis conflict for the most part results from dif-
\ ferences in the statute being considered. Some 
''--statutes, it is said, make a specific provision with 
regard to the question. Where the statute does 
not specifically or indirectly require a holding that 
the use of corrective lens must be taken into ac--
count the great weight of authority is that the 
compensation should be computed without the use 
of such corrective lens. (Citations omitted.) 
"It is conceded we have no statute in this state 
which requires the commissioner or the court, in 
considering the amount of compensation due for 
an injury to an eye, to take into consideration the 
10 
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aid which might be furnished by corrective lens. 
On the contrary our statute with respect to sched-
uled injuries has been uniformly construed as 
being the sole guide to determine the amount of 
compensation when the injury is once deter-
mined." (Citations omitted.) P. 470. 
C. THE PURPOSE OF THE WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION ACT IS TO PROVIDE 
COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF OR 
DA11l.AGE TO A BODY MEMBER AND 
NOT SOLELY TO PROVIDE FOR LOSS 
OF EARNING POWER. 
Petitioners place a good deal of reliance in the case 
of Hr ashington Terminal Compan,y v. H oage, et al., 79 
~,. 2d 158 (1935), from the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia. The court held that the em-
ployee's injury should have been determined after cor-
rertiotl from eyeglasses. This case is representative 
of the state minority view of New York and :Michigan 
in that it stresses the proposition that the intention of 
the Workmen's Compensation Law is to provide com-
pensation for loss or disability of earning power and 
not indemnity or damages for injury to a member of 
the body. It is submitted that this view of the purpose 
of the \Yorkmen's Compensation Law is demonstrably in 
error. 
Samuel B. Horovitz, in his work entitled ''Current 
Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensa-
tion,'' published in :J[ay, August and November, 1947, 
is~tws of The Law Sorietv Journal, Vol XII Nos 6 ,..., 
. . ' . ' ' 
and S, has an excellent chapter on the history and theory 
11 
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of the Workmen's Compensation Acts. On page 470, 
Mr. Horovitz states : 
''Unquestionably, compensation laws were en-
acted as a humanitarian measure to create a new 
type of liability - liability without fault - to 
make the industry that was responsible for the 
injury bear a major part of the burdens resulting 
therefrom. It was a revolt from the old common 
law and the creation of a complete substitute 
therefor, and not a mere improvement therein. It 
meant to make liability dependent on a relation-
ship to the job, in a liberal, humane fashion, with 
litigation reduced to a minimum. It meant to cut 
out the narrow common law methods of denying 
awards.'' (Citations omitted.) 
Horovitz continues on page 478 with a quote from 
Mr. Justice Sutherland of the United States Supreme 
Court, who wrote in 1932 : 
''The modern development and growth of in-
dustry, with the consequent changes in the rela-
tions of employer and employee, have been so pro-
found in character and degree as to take away, in 
large measure, the applicability of the doctrine 
upon which rests the common law liability of the 
master for personal injury to a servant, leaving 
of necessity a field of debatable ground where a 
good deal must be conceded in favor of forms of 
legislation, calculated to establish new bases of 
liability more in harmony with these changed con-
ditions.'' Cudahy Packing Company v. Parra... 
more, 263 U. S. 418, 423, 44 S. Ct. 153 (1923). 
Horovitz concludes that this new theory of compen-
sation which now prevails in all but one state was "that 
industry (and ultimately the consumer) should bear its 
12 
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fnir share of the cost of injuries of workers without try-
ing to place the blame on either party. The relation of 
the injury to the job was to be the test, not the relation 
of the injury to fault or blame or negligence.'' Page 
479. It is clear from Horovitz's thorough analysis of~ 
the Workmen's Compensation Laws that their purpose 
was in fact to provide compensation, indemnity or dam-
ages for injuries to a member of the body, rather than, 
ns stated in the minority views, to provide compensa-
tion for loss of earning power as such. / 
Mr. Horovitz's theory is further substantiated by 
the fact that, as pointed out in Point IA, infra, almost 
all the states which have workmen's compensation laws 
havP statutory schedules for the loss of various limbs 
and members of the body, and that these statutory sched-
ules are always followed in any given cases. For exam-
ple, the Utah statute provides that compensation is to 
be paid weekly for one hundred and forty weeks for the 
loss of one leg between the knee and ankle. If the theory 
of the Workmen's Compensation Law were to provide 
compensation for loss or disability of earning power, 
the Commission would have to decrease this award where 
tlw injured person was a watchmaker. On the other 
hand, it would appear that the award should be increased 
where the person was a professional tennis player. Since 
these adjustments cannot be made under our statute, nor 
under the statutes of the vast majority of the other states, 
it is obvious that the statutory purpose is not to com-
pensate for loss of earning power. Rather, the thought 
i~ that a monetary Yalue should be assigned to each mem-
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her of the body and that this value should be paid to the 
person regardless of whether there is an impairment of 
earning power. It is submitted that the lV ashington Ter-
minal, New York, and Michigan courts have misinter-
preted the purpose and spirit of the acts. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the Industrial Commission in this case 
awarding compensation based on uncorrected loss of 
visual function is in harmony with sound reasoning and 
with the vast weight of authority from states with simi-
lar statutes, and should be affirmed by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
FREDERICK S. PRINCE, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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